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PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT: THE CASE OF THE MEDICAL BOARD
OF AUSTRALIA v TAUSIF (OCCUPATIONAL DISCIPLINE)
In 2014, the Australian Capital Territory Civil and Administrative Appeals
Tribunal (ACAT) made a finding of professional misconduct against a Canberra
general practitioner working in two bulk-billing medical practices established
by a corporate medical practice service company, Primary Health Care Limited
(Medical Board of Australia v Tausif (Occupational Discipline) [2015] ACAT 4).
This column analyses that case, particularly in relation to the ACAT finding that
the practitioner’s professional misconduct was substantially contributed to by
an unsafe system of care, specifically, the failure of Primary Health Care to
provide supervision and mentoring for clinicians working at its medical centres.
The case highlights the professional pressures carried by general practitioners
who practise medicine within the framework of corporate bulk-billing business
models. The column also examines the related issue of general practitioner
co-payments in Australia and their impact on business models built around
doctors purportedly characterised as independent contractors, bulk-billing
large numbers of patients each day for short consultations.

INTRODUCTION: TENSION BETWEEN PROFESSIONAL
FOR-PROFIT MEDICAL PRACTICE MODELS

STANDARDS AND CORPORATE

In Medical Board of Australia v Tausif (Occupational Discipline), the ACT Civil and Administrative
Appeals Tribunal made a finding of professional misconduct against a Canberra general practitioner
who had inappropriately prescribed Sch 8 medications, particularly opioids, and kept inadequate
patient records. Yet the Tribunal rejected the Medical Board’s recommendation for cancellation of
registration.1 A major reason for this was the exacerbation of the practitioner’s problems because of
inadequate mentoring and supervision for the practitioner while she worked with drug-dependent
patients in two bulk-billing medical centres. The Tribunal found this lack of institutional quality
control arose from the contractual organisation of doctors’ relationships with practice management
where that management failed to engage with governance arrangements supporting the requisite
standard of care.2 The Tribunal also found that the “first available doctor” (no appointments) business
model subverted the autonomy of the practitioner to develop high-quality relationships in the
monitoring and care of patients.3
The Tausif case puts the spotlight on the ambiguities arising from corporate practice control
models, which determine that medicine as practised on a day-to-day basis should first and foremost be
profitable for corporate owners of the practice, while attempting to distance owners from professional
responsibilities for ensuring a safe system of care, through the adoption of “independent contractor”
legal-financial arrangements with contracted doctors.
Employment law regarding contractors has been a growing area of law as increasingly contractual
workforce arrangements replace employee arrangements across many industries. This column
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examines a number of key issues that have been exposed by cases in Australia and overseas regarding
the apportionment of responsibility vis-à-vis independent contractors and principals in the workplace.
Relevant to the practice context within which this column analyses the Tausif case is the
corporatisation of general practice in Australia which began to gather momentum during the
mid-1990s when a number of companies began to offer practitioners “practice management” services.4
These services handle all the administrative aspects of a practice, including finance, staffing and
information technology as well as the provision of treatment facilities and equipment. Doctors are
offered lucrative terms to sell their practices to these companies.5
The management structure of corporate medical centres is typically based on business models
developed to maximise profitability through administrative system efficiencies, risk management and
trading on financial markets.
These business models effectively impose a corporate superstructure (a new tier) on medical
practice, which impacts upon the practice of medicine, the doctor-patient relationship and collegial
relationships between doctors.
This column examines these impacts, as revealed by the Tausif case, and highlights the need for
greater consideration by professional oversight bodies in Australia of the challenges such corporate
business models are likely to pose for medical quality and public safety.

PRACTITIONER’S

PROBLEMS WITH PRESCRIBING OPIOIDS TO DRUG-ADDICTED

PATIENTS

On 6 December 2013, the Medical Board of Australia brought a disciplinary action to ACAT against
Dr Syeda Tausif for alleged professional misconduct in regards to her prescribing practices for
controlled medicines and her inadequate and incomplete patient health records.
Dr Tausif (the respondent) was contracted, at the time, through her company Syeda & Shaikh Pty
Ltd to provide GP medical services at Ginninderra and Phillip Medical Centres, which are part of a
nationwide network of medical practices owned and operated by Primary Health Care Limited.
The possibility of misconduct regarding Dr Tausif had first been brought to the attention of the
ACT Chief Health Officer who then notified the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency
(AHPRA) on 29 August 2012.
An investigation made by the Medical Board, under s 160 of the National Law, revealed that
Dr Tausif had over the period 2011-2012 prescribed controlled medicines (opioids) without the
approval of the Chief Medical Officer as required by the Medicines, Poisons and Therapeutics Goods
Act 2008 (ACT).6 It was also found that she had prescribed these drugs in doses and/or at frequencies
that the safety of drug-dependent patients, many of whom were taking other medications, was put at
risk.
It was further alleged that her medical records were in breach of the Medical Board’s Code of
Conduct for Doctors,7 specifically in relation to failure to take and record adequate notes; record
patients’ requests for controlled medicines; make or record a diagnosis; consider and record a patient’s
medical history; or provide a treatment plan.
On 13 September 2012, the Board placed conditions on Dr Tausif’s registration citing her “lack of
awareness of the seriousness of her practise patterns and lack of awareness of her professional
4
Definition of general practice corporatisation used: “when a general practice becomes, or is acquired by, a for-profit company
registered under the Corporations Act 2001.” See Medicare Financing and Analysis Branch, Department of Health and Ageing,
State of Corporatisation: A Report on the Corporatisation of General Practices in Australia (February 2012) p 8.
5
In 2010, Primary Health Care was typically paying $400,000 for goodwill in a practice: Creswell A, “GP Defends Clinics in
Mailout”, The Australian (9 November 2010), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/gp-defends-clinics-in-mailout/
story-e6frg6nf-1225949648843?nk=fdee966a57d21100ee09d28478a285b4.
6

The Board’s preliminary assessment was in accordance with s 149(1)(a) of the National Law.

7

Medical Board of Australia, Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia (revised 17 March 2014).
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obligations under the legislation”, in responding to a show cause notice issued under s 157 of the
National Law. In the interests of protecting public health and safety (s 156(1)(a)), the Board placed a
condition on her registration under s 178(2)(c):
Not to prescribe any S4 or S8 medications, including controlled medicines requiring Chief Health
Officer Approval under the Medicines, Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Act 2008, pending further
investigation into the matter.8

Following an investigation, the Board filed an application for disciplinary action in December
2014 against Dr Tausif with the Tribunal.
Two months later, the Board procured the respondent’s prescribing history from the Department
of Human Services (Medicare) in order to investigate concerns that the respondent may have been
prescribing Sch 4 and Sch 8 medications in breach of the conditions placed on her practice.9 On
20 February 2014, the Board proposed to suspend her registration. Dr Tausif responded with written
and oral submissions (26 and 27 February) which satisfied the Board that “immediate action was not
warranted”.10 Then on 5 March 2014 she made another written submission requesting that the
restrictions on prescribing Sch 4 medicines (which include antibiotics and other commonly prescribed
medications) be lifted. She argued that restrictions on prescribing routine medications amounted to a
“suspension of practice” which in the circumstances was not warranted.11 On 27 March 2014, the
Board refused Dr Tausif’s request, maintaining imposition of all conditions on her practice. Following
another alleged breach of her conditions, regarding the prescribing of a clinically appropriate
antibiotic from a prescription pad signed by another doctor, the Board decided to suspend her
registration as of 6 May 2014.12

LACK

OF SUPERVISION AND MENTORING A FACTOR IN TRIBUNAL’S FINDING OF
PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT

An amended application for disciplinary action (the amended application) was filed and the Tribunal
was informed on 2 June 2014 that the respondent:
intended to concede that the conduct alleged represented “professional misconduct” within the meaning
of s 5 of the National Law.13

At the Tribunal hearing in June 2014, Dr Tausif did not challenge any of the expert opinion or
other evidence presented in relation to the occasions it was alleged her practices were unsafe for
patients. After weighing the evidence, the Tribunal made a finding of professional misconduct within
the meaning of s 5 of the National Law.14
The Tribunal found that the impugned conduct represented significant global problems with the
respondent’s clinical competence and judgment. Of particular concern were the respondent’s unsafe
prescribing (particularly on occasion unusually large amounts and to patients who appeared to be
abusing the system due to addictions) of Schedule 8 medications and her failure to accept and utilise
advice from colleagues about such patients, even when it was expressly written in clinical notes.15

Yet the Tribunal also found that Dr Tausif’s professional problems appeared “to have gone undetected,
uncorrected and unreported in the two practices in which she worked for approximately three years,
the Ginninderra and Phillip practices of Primary Health Care”.16
8
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Evidence was sought by the Tribunal at hearings in July and November 2014, to determine the
“nature of mentoring and supervision” at both practices.17 Evidence from the lead doctors, Dr Ajulo
and Dr Johar, indicated that training for commencement at the practices was in the use of the billing
system, that supervision and mentoring were not a specified responsibility of the lead doctors, and that
“occasional in-house clinical meetings” were organised, but that the respondent was unable to attend
because she was rostered out-of-hours. Dr Ajulo and Dr Johar asserted that the:
AHPRA-certified “independent contractor” nature of the contractual arrangements between doctors and
Primary Health Care precluded much supervision and mentoring.18

In further evidence pertaining to their knowledge of Dr Tausif’s prescribing restrictions they
stated that Primary Health Care had not sent them a letter advising them of the situation or how to deal
with it.19 They did, however, become aware that she was unable to prescribe Sch 8 medications.
Dr Johar said he responded by having “a few chats” with her.20 Dr Ajulo declined to offer her any
supervision or mentoring as he considered it was not his “contracted role” to do so.21 Ironically, in
regards to her Sch 4 and Sch 8 prescribing restrictions, he said “it would be difficult” to work with
such restrictions in such a practice.22 The Tribunal took this to imply that:
there was no general acknowledgement of responsibility to assist the respondent to comply with those
restrictions whilst she was still working in those practices. An argument can be made that these aspects
of professional practise at the Ginninderra and Phillips practices of Primary Health Care contravene the
requirement for public protection and safety in section 18 of the HP Act [Health Professionals Act 2004
(ACT)].23

That Dr Tausif chose to continue working at the practices, even though it was difficult under the
Sch 4 and Sch 8 prescribing restrictions, arose in evidence at the Tribunal, emanating from her
concerns that there would be “severe financial consequences as a result of her contract with the
company” if she stopped working.24 The Tribunal went on to conclude that:
a large part of the respondent’s problems arose in the case of each suspension, from the low levels of
supervision and mentoring available in the Phillip and Ginninderra practices of Primary Health Care.25

Dr Johar admitted in evidence that the Phillip Centre practice “has responsibilities to patients
beyond those of specific doctors to specific patients in individual clinical encounters”.26 However, the
Tribunal was not privy to any documentation setting out what the responsibilities of lead doctors were
or whether they met with AHPRA compliance standards.27
The Tribunal did not find fault with Dr Johar or Dr Ajulo, but rather considered the lack of
supervision and mentoring to be systemic in that it related to the contractual arrangements between
practitioners and Primary Health Care. The Tribunal went on to find that it was a:
failure of the leadership of Primary Health Care to engage properly in its governance arrangements with
the requisite professional standards required for public protection and safety [under s 8 of the Health
Professionals Act 2004 (ACT)].28
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The Medical Board sought cancellation of registration of Dr Tausif on the grounds of the:
unsafe way the respondent had administered and documented her Schedule 8 prescriptions … and the
way in which she attempted to circumvent the admittedly harsh Schedule 4 prescription restriction the
Medical Board imposed.29

The Tribunal fundamentally concurred with the Board stating that:
The respondent’s conduct does seem to have evinced a lack of assertiveness in standing up to dependent
patients, a lack of due diligence in understanding and complying with the Medical Board’s restrictions
and an inability to properly understand how to modify and document her professional conduct in regard
to peer feedback.30

However, the Tribunal ordered that conditions be imposed that aimed at rectifying the respondent’s
conduct. The basis of this response was the Tribunal’s findings that there was “no fundamental failing
in the respondent’s initial medical training”.31
Dr Tausif was born in Bangladesh in 1969. She studied medicine at the Sylhet Medical School
and completed her internship at Sylhet hospital.32 She worked as a doctor for the Bangladesh
Garments Manufacturers’ Association Health Centre for five years before migrating to Australia with
her husband, who was also a doctor. Prior to receiving unconditional registration with the Medical
Board of Australia, she was an intern at Canberra Hospital and a Resident Medical Officer at Calvary
Hospital.33 From December 2008 to March 2011, she worked as a general practitioner at the
Gungahlin Medical Centre where she received supervision and mentoring from practitioners who
“vetted her workload and patient distribution to suit her experience”.34
The Tribunal also took into consideration that no patients were known to have brought a
complaint against the respondent and that her “non-Schedule 8 prescribing appeared to have been
clinically appropriate”.35
The Tribunal also found that the lack of professional development in the way of clinical
supervision and mentoring were a significant contributing factor to her unsafe Sch 8 prescribing
practices and poor patient records management.36
The Tribunal was guided in its decisions by the principles established in three key cases:
HCCC v Dr Della Bruna [2014] NSWCATOD 31 [which] require[d] that the paramount consideration
be protection of public health and safety. Protection of the profession’s ethical and clinical standards is
also an important consideration (HCCC v Litchfield (1997) 41 NSWLR 630 at 637); as is public
confidence in the profession … and encouragement of professional compliance with appropriate
standards (Prakash v HCCC [2006] NSWCA 153]).37

The Tribunal ordered that Dr Tausif have Level 2 supervision by a Board-approved supervisor,
whether she worked in general practice or in a hospital.38 As a further means to improve her clinical
practice through professional development, the Tribunal ordered that she undertake remedial courses
specified by the Board.39
29

Tausif [2015] ACAT 4 at [52].

30

Tausif [2015] ACAT 4 at [52].

31

Tausif [2015] ACAT 4 at [56].

32

Tausif [2015] ACAT 4 at [2].

33

Tausif [2015] ACAT 4 at [3].

34

Tausif [2015] ACAT 4 at [3].

35

Tausif [2015] ACAT 4 at [53].

36

Tausif [2015] ACAT 4 at [53].

37

Tausif [2015] ACAT 4 at [55].

38

Tausif [2015] ACAT 4 at [60] (Order 1(a)).

39

Tausif [2015] ACAT 4 at [60] (Order 1(d)).

538

(2015) 22 JLM 534

Medical law reporter

The Tribunal also ordered that the restrictions on prescribing Sch 8 medications continue and
could only be withdrawn or changed by written approval from the Board.40 However, in relation to
Sch 4 drugs, the Tribunal found that withdrawal of authority to prescribe Sch 4 drugs contributed to
the respondent’s problems, as the restriction rendered her practice as a GP untenable. The Tribunal
was critical of the Board’s imposition of Sch 4 drugs restriction as it amounted to a “de-facto
suspension”.41 The Tribunal ordered the lifting of the restriction and ordered remedial education for
the respondent in prescribing practices, patient management and patient mental health.42
The decision to impose professional support through education rather than cancellation of
registration also recognised that Dr Tausif had little choice in patient selection and was required to
treat drug-dependent patients, a known class of difficult patient, whom she was inexperienced in
treating:43
The Tribunal ordered the respondent’s authority to prescribe Schedule 4 drugs to be restored once the
respondent was working in compliance with the conditions imposed and was certified that she was
doing so by a lead doctor at her practice.44

The Tribunal ordered Dr Tausif to be subject to audits of her clinical notes, at intervals required
by the Board, to ensure her compliance with Pt 4 and Sch 2 of the Health Practitioner Regulation
(ACT) 2010 (ACT) and the RACGP’s Standards for General Practices (4th ed), in particular
Standard 1.7 “Content of Patient Health Records”.45

MEDICAL

DUTY TO PROVIDE A SAFE SYSTEM OF CARE IN THE CONTEXT OF
CORPORATE BUSINESS MODELS

The Tausif case is significant because it supports as a principle of sound medical practice that the
medical services provided by an individual practitioner should not be scrutinised for compliance with
appropriate standards in isolation from a detailed examination of the business and practice models
within which such practitioners work.
In placing Dr Tausif within the context of that system, the Tribunal recognised that:
a Tribunal addressing public protection and safety as required by section 3(2)(a) of the Health
Practitioner Regulation National Law (ACT) (the National Law) and section 18 of the Health
Professionals Act 2004 (ACT) (the HP Act) should consider not just the conduct of a registered
practitioner but also the nature of the system in which he or she practises, including that system’s levels
of training, supervision, mentorship and quality control.46

The system within which Dr Tausif worked was established by Primary Health Care, an
ASX listed company, specialising in the provision of “management services” to health professionals.
The company is one of the top three in the Australian corporate health market, along with Sonic
Healthcare and Healthscope. Primary Health Care controls a network of medical centres, pathology
and diagnostics services and health management software. The company expanded its network of
medical centres by purchasing practices and then contracting doctors from those practices to work in
the centres. It has also purchased large consolidated practice companies such as Symbion (formerly
Mayne Nickless).47
Essential to understanding the nature of the system operating at the Ginninderra and Phillip
practices were the financial arrangements that Dr Tausif entered into with Primary Health Care.
Primary Health Care’s business model appeared from what was found by the Tribunal to be carefully
40
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constructed to maximise revenues, reduce costs and limit liabilities. It is a natural goal of corporate
risk management to attempt to minimise legal problems associated with “responsibilities” for the
provision of services to the public, especially in health care where litigation risk is high. Documents
submitted to the Tribunal show Primary Health Care’s corporate structure to consist of three key
entities, Primary Health Care Limited, Artlu Unit Trust and its trustee company Idameneo (No 123)
Pty Ltd.48
According to the Tribunal, the financial arrangements between Dr Tausif and Primary Health Care
were established through a contract called a “Sale of Practice” between her company, Syeda & Shaikh
Pty Ltd, and Idameneo (No 123) Pty Ltd.49 This contract stated that Dr Tausif was to provide medical
services “for no less than 45 hours per week for 48 calendar weeks per financial year”.50 Another
document, “Performance Guarantee Incorporated Medical Practitioner”, set out the obligations of the
“independent contractor” to provide medical services under the “Provision of Services to Incorporated
Medical Practitioner” “which included seeking payments from Medicare (clause 4.3), 50% of which
were to be kept (plus a GST rate) by Idameneo Pty Ltd as remuneration for use of the premises
(clause 6)”.51 Over a three-year period at Primary Health Care, Dr Tausif had approximately 30,000
patient consultations averaging 40-50 patients a day and was paid $8 per patient.52 She was also paid
a retainer described as “substantial”.53
The Provision of Services document also stated what Primary’s agreed provision to the
incorporated medical practitioner would be. The Tribunal noted that:
The services and facilities agreed to be provided by the company as “reasonably necessary for the
conduct of an incorporated medical practice” (clause 3.2(b)) did not include clinical supervision or
mentoring.54

The contractual arrangements between the companies defines the relationship as that of
independent contractor to principal. This common type of workplace arrangement, which replaces the
older style employer-employee relationship, has created a great deal of uncertainty pertaining to the
responsibilities of each entity for workplace practices and for when things go awry in the workplace.
The courts have been at pains to define the meaning of employee and contractor.55
In Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Fox, the High Court established that a principal had a duty of
care to ensure an independent contractor was competent, even though it deemed:
The relationship between principal and independent contractor is not one which, of itself, gives rise to
a common law duty of care, much less to the special duty resting on employers to ensure that care is
taken.56

Primary Health Care’s contracts were carefully crafted to exclude employee relationships and to
establish their definition of what is “reasonably necessary for the conduct of an incorporated medical
practice” by excluding references to supervision and mentoring.57
48
Other subsidiaries in the group are Idameneo (No 124) Pty Ltd, PHC (No 01) Pty Ltd, PHC Nominees Pty Ltd and former
SDS Pty Ltd. Idameneo (No 122) Pty Ltd is also listed as a major shareholder on Primary Health Care Limited’s website:
http://www.primaryhealthcare.com.au/IRM/content/investors_top20shareholders.html.
49

The Tribunal subpoenaed financial documents due to the respondent’s reluctance to reveal these arrangements: Tausif [2015]
ACAT 4 at [19].

50

Tausif [2015] ACAT 4 at [20].
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Tausif [2015] ACAT 4 at [21].
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Tausif [2015] ACAT 4 at [19]. The Tribunal heard evidence that Dr Tausif received 50% of the Medicare bulk-billing fee
(which was $36 per patient). However, she received a lower fee ($10 less) because she was designated a “non-vocational”
doctor. It was because of this reduction that that her final payment was $8 per patient.
53

Tausif [2015] ACAT 4 at [19].
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Tausif [2015] ACAT 4 at [21].
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Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 21; Sweeney v Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd (2006) 226 CLR 161.
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The decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Waco Kwikform Ltd v Perigo,58
however, suggests that this exclusion may not hold in circumstances where the principal has become
aware that supervision is needed. In Waco Kwikform, a supplier of scaffolding equipment was deemed
to be liable for the injuries caused to an employee of a subcontractor, Bradley Tracey Scaffolding
Services Pty Ltd (BTSS). Waco Kwikform had assessed that the subcontractor was not sufficiently
competent to undertake the work without supervision. In 2006, Waco Kwikform assumed
responsibility for the plan of work and supervision of scaffolding installation undertaken by the
subcontractor. It was held that if the employee’s accident had occurred before it had assumed
supervision of BTSS’s work, it would not have owed a duty of care to him or any other BTSS
employee, except in regard to the scaffolding equipment. Waco Kwikform had inadvertently become
liable by means of its attempt to manage an occupational health and safety risk. The case’s
counterintuitive outcome in regards to duty of care and supervision indicates the difficulties that may
arise when the law is the only guide to practice policy.
In the United States during the 1990s there were numerous decisions pertaining to “enterprise
liability” under which managed care providers were found liable for selection and supervision of
health care providers.59 In McClellan v Health Maintenance Organization, it was found that the
Health Maintenance Organization “had a non-delegable duty to select and retain only competent
physicians”60 and in Doe v Dyer-Goode, the court stated that:
We find that the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to state a cause of action for negligence in the
selection, retention, and/or evaluation of the primary care physician.61

In the wake of Waco Kwikform and the legal decisions in the United States, it is arguable that
Primary Health Care’s medical practices model of contracting doctors without the provision of
supervision and mentoring, a model aiming at reducing their costs and liabilities, may fail to diminish
their liability in circumstances where they know that a practitioner’s conduct presents a risk to others.
Two lead doctors from the Ginninderra and Phillip practices, giving evidence at the Tribunal,
claimed they had not been advised in a letter by Primary Health Care of the restrictions placed on
Dr Tausif’s practice by the Board.62 Consequently, no remedial action was taken by either practice or
Primary Health Care in the way of supervision or mentoring to assist the respondent. The implication
was that Primary Health Care assumed it was up to the respondent’s company (with whom the
contract was made) to meet the requirements of s 18 of the Health Professionals Act 2004 (ACT),
even though her company was merely a contractual entity and not a means by which she could garner
professional support.
The responsibility of the principal for providing a safe system of care in a medical practice may
also fall within legal ambit of non-delegable duty of care. In New South Wales v Lepore,63 the High
Court established that a non-delegable duty of care existed in matters where people are deemed to be
vulnerable. There are many vulnerable clients in a medical practice, and specifically in this case where
the respondent’s patient load included a number of patients with drug dependencies and/or mental
illness.
Dr Tausif claimed that the “first available doctor” system, which placed her established patients
down the queue from walk-in patients, resulted in her losing these patients because of the lengthy
waiting times.64 This system did not support continuity of care for her patients, a mode of care best
58

Waco Kwikform Ltd v Perigo [2014] NSWCA 140.

59

Graber BJ, “Legal Crisis Threatens Managed Care”, Best’s Review (Property/Casualty Insurance Edition, October-November
1995).
60

McClellan v Health Maintenance Organization 604 A 2d 1053 at fn 7 (1992).

61

Doe v Dyer-Goode 566 A 2d 889 at 892 (1989).

62

Tausif [2015] ACAT 4 at [45].

63

New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511.

64

Tausif [2015] ACAT 4 at [46].
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able to ensure patient safety. The respondent ended up treating a number of drug-dependent patients, a
group with which she was not familiar, because there was no lead doctor allocating patients to
practitioners.
Instead, Primary Health Care provided a centralised, online patient record system accessible by all
doctors in the medical centres and by Primary’s management. Some of these records were from
practices sold to Primary Health Care, which were transferred to Primary when the doctor was
contracted. This is part of the “Sale of Practice”, as patient records are generally listed as a component
of the “goodwill” being sold by the incorporating practice.65 The patient records system is critical to
the “first available doctor” practice model for, without it, treating doctors would have to take detailed
patient histories repeatedly, reducing their efficiency:
It was apparent to the Tribunal that the respondent’s professional problems appear to have gone
undetected, uncorrected and unreported in the two practices in which she worked for approximately
three years, the Ginninderra and Phillip practices of Primary Health Care.66

However, the centralised records system did not reduce the possibility of a culture defined by
levels of disclosure not in keeping with the standards of the Medical Board’s Code of Practice.67 The
respondent was found to have poor patient record practice, which should have shown up on the patient
records system but was not detected. Primary Health Care has sued at least 36 doctors working at their
practices since 2008.68 This may have caused some contractors to be reticent about bringing problems
appearing in the records system to light.
In the Leighton case, the High Court established the principle that specific circumstances of work
must be considered.69 Many medical practices offer a networked collegial environment governed by
strict professional standards and regulations.
Avoiding clinical supervision and mentoring in an attempt to reduce liability may actually escalate
the risk of liability. The Tribunal found:
that the respondent’s professional misconduct was substantially contributed to by the lack of clinical
supervision and mentorship she experienced at the Primary Health Care Ltd practices at Phillip and
Ginninderra.70

Further, by allowing the misconduct to go “undetected, uncorrected and unreported”,71 Primary
Health Care was not providing a safe system of care and therefore was breaching their non-delegable
duty of care to patients attending the centres.
Brooke LJ in Robertson v Nottingham Health Authority, found that there was a common law duty
on a health care providing institution to ensure a safe system of care:
Although it is customary to say that a health authority is vicariously liable for breach of duty if its
responsible servants or agents fail to set up a safe system of operation in relation to what are essentially
management as opposed to clinical matters, this formulation may tend to cloud the fact that in any event
it has a non-delegable duty to establish a proper system of care just as much as it has a duty to engage
competent staff and a duty to provide proper and safe equipment and safe premises.72
65
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RELATIONSHIP

WITH THE AUSTRALIAN BULK-BILLING SYSTEM

The Tausif case illustrates how private corporations utilising the bulk-billing model to earn profits may
create an unsafe system of care for patients. The Australian bulk-billing system was recently the centre
of a public policy debate over a proposed co-payment.
The GP co-payment concept was promoted initially by the Australian Centre for Health Research,
a private health funds “think tank”, in its submission to the National Commission of Audit in
December 2013.73 It recommended a $6 co-payment for patients using bulk-billing services such as
those that appear to dominate the business model of health care providers such as Primary Health
Care.
On 9 December 2014, the Abbott government announced it would not proceed with a $7 patient
co-payment fee for bulk-billed consultations. The fee to patients would be recast as a $5 cut in the
Medicare rebate to bulk-billing doctors treating non-concession patients. Doctors, at their discretion,
could recoup the lost income by charging patients a $5 co-payment fee. Concessional patients, which
include pensioners and children under 16 years, would be exempt.74 There would also be a freeze on
Medicare rebate increases for doctors and rebates would be standardised for consultations between 10
and 19 minutes. The latter change was seen as a clumsy attempt to improve the quality of care by
discouraging “six minute medicine”. Again this latter change did not affect concessional patients.75
These announced changes initially saw Primary Health Care lose 6% off its share value, but the
price began to recover after analysts reported that 70% of Primary’s business was concessional
cardholders and children – patient groups which are exempt from the changes.76
The Minister for Health, Sussan Ley, announced further changes on 15 January 2015 which added
GP mental health plans and GP management plans to the rebate exemptions list.77 These products
would favour practices that provide multidisciplinary services. These changes were to be effective
from 1 July 2015.
Corporations like Primary Health Care are driving bulk-billing in co-operation with the
government because the system gives certainty to their income base.78 Their key target market appears
to be low socioeconomic areas, which supply their practices with patients who are largely paid for by
the government.79 These patients are also largely exempt from government “price signal” policy, so
the patient demand for their services is high, which in turn supports the “fast churn” business model
they operate, with GPs processing 40-60 patients a day.
The volatility created by the serial revision of co-payment policy is good for the traders because
the money is made in the price shifts, so with every co-payment policy revision made by the
government, millions of dollars worth of shares change hands on the markets and for every trade
made, commissions are made by the investment banks.
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This is good news for Primary Health Care’s biggest shareholders, most of whom are investment
banks, National Nominees Limited, HSBC, UBS, JP Morgan, RBC Dexia Investor Services, Citicorp
and Idameneo (No 122) Pty Ltd.80

CONCLUSION
The corporate medical services sector does not dominate the Australian market, but it is growing. It is,
however, a powerful sector of the GP services market due to its high revenues and profitability.81
In recent times, the corporate health care practice market has consolidated to three major publicly
listed companies, Primary Health Care, Sonic Healthcare and Healthscope.82 These companies have
expanded their businesses through vertical and horizontal integration across a multiple of
health-related businesses, including pathology, imaging diagnostic services and IT.
This corporate health sector continues to grow through the acquisition of GP practices, dental
clinics and allied health services. The Australian health care market is very attractive to global health
providers. Australia’s health care system expends 9.4% of gross domestic product (GDP) and has an
average life expectancy of 82 years.83 This is in comparison to the Unites States which spends 17.4%
of GDP on health while only achieving an average life expectancy of 78.8 years.84 From the
Australian citizen’s perspective, these figures represent comparative value for money in a system that
is still largely public in the hospital sector, and in general practice is still dominated by small business
models that include partnerships, sole traders and associateships. However, from an investor’s
perspective these figures represent the untapped capacity of Australians to pay much more for health
care. This was made clear by United States consultancy firm Bain & Company, which stated in its
Global Healthcare Private Equity Report in 2013 that:
Australia also continues to be an attractive area of investment for private equity investors, given the
favorable macro trends and under-penetration of many private healthcare offerings.85

The new corporate business models have introduced another tier of stakeholders called
shareholders, into the health services market. The apparent link between the Ginninderra and Phillip
practices and shareholder bank vaults in Sydney, New York, Chicago and London reflects that new
reality – a new tier of profitability operating in the health sector, which did not exist 25 years ago. It
is a reality with which professional regulatory bodies, such as those in the Tausif case, must
increasingly deal.
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